基于知识编辑的大模型内容安全治理

张宁豫　浙江大学

大模型内容安全治理背景

AI内容治理

- 大模型**内容生成幻觉、安全、隐私问题**

Google DeepMind

arxiv.org/abs/123

2024-06-05

Generative AI Misuse: A Taxonomy of Tactics and Insights from Real-World Data

Nahema Marchal[*,1], Rachel Xu[*,2], Rasmi Elasmar[3], Iason Gabriel[1], Beth Goldberg[2] and William Isaac[1]
[*]Equal contributions, [1]Google DeepMind, [2]Jigsaw, [3]Google.org

Generative, multimodal artificial intelligence (GenAI) offers transformative potential across industries, but its misuse poses significant risks. Prior research has shed light on the potential of advanced AI systems to be exploited for malicious purposes. However, we still lack a concrete understanding of how GenAI models are specifically exploited or abused in practice, including the tactics employed to inflict harm. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of GenAI misuse tactics, informed by existing academic literature and a qualitative analysis of approximately 200 observed incidents of misuse reported between January 2023 and March 2024. Through this analysis, we illuminate key and novel patterns in misuse during this time period, including potential motivations, strategies, and how attackers leverage and abuse system capabilities across modalities (e.g. image, text, audio, video) in the wild.

	Tactic	Definition	Example
Model integrity	Prompt injection	Manipulate model prompts to enable unintended or unauthorised outputs	ChatGPT workaround returns lists of problematic sites if asked for avoidance purposes
	Adversarial input	Add small perturbations to model input to generate incorrect or harmful outputs	Researchers find perturbing images and sounds successfully poisons open source LLMs
	Jailbreaking	Bypass restrictions on model's safeguards	Researchers train LLM to jailbreak other LLMs
	Model diversion	Repurpose pre-trained model to deviate from its intended purpose	We Tested Out The Uncensored Chatbot FreedomGPT
	Model extraction	Obtain model hyperparameters, architecture, or parameters	ChatGPT Spills Secrets in Novel PoC Attack
	Steganography	Hide message within model output to avoid detection	Secret Messages Can Hide in AI-Generated Media
	Poisoning	Manipulate a model's training data to alter behaviour	Researchers plant misinformation as memories in BlenderBot 2.0
Data integrity	Privacy compromise	Compromise the privacy of training data	Samsung bans use of ChatGPT on corporate devices following leak
	Data exfiltration	Compromise the security of training data	Researchers find ways to extract terabytes of training data from ChatGPT

数据治理 → **模型治理** → 应用治理

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AI内容治理

- 大模型**内容生成幻觉、安全、隐私问题**





数据治理 → 模型治理 → 应用治理

大模型内容安全治理背景

AI内容治理

- 当心AI给你“洗脑”！MIT最新研究：大模型成功给人类植入错误记忆

Conversational AI Powered by Large Language Models Amplifies False Memories in Witness Interviews

Samantha Chan[1*], Pat Pataranutaporn[1*], Aditya Suri[1*], Wazeer Zulfikar[1], Pattie Maes[1], and Elizabeth F. Loftus[2]

[1]MIT Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02142
[2]University of California, Irvine CA 92612
[*]equal contributions, corresponding author(s): swtchan@media.mit.edu, patpat@media.mit.edu



Gary Marcus @GaryMarcus · Sep 2

We are giving insane power, with almost zero checks and balances, to chatbot manufacturers.

The study below, combined with the fact above, is terrifying.



数据治理 → 模型治理 → 应用治理

大模型内容安全问题分析

Anthropic @AnthropicAI · May 21
New Anthropic research paper: Scaling Monosemanticity.

The first ever detailed look inside a leading large language model.

Read the blog post here: anthropic.com/research/mappi...

Anthropic 确定参数中的数百万个概念（含大量不安全知识）

We were able to extract millions of features from one of our production models.



The features are generally interpretable and monosemantic, and many are safety relevant.

Feature #1M/847723

Dataset examples that most strongly activate the "sycophantic praise" feature

"Oh, thank you." "You are a generous and gracious man." "I say that all the time, don't I, men?" "Tell

in the pit of hate." "Yes, oh, master." "Your wisdom is unquestionable." "But will you, great lord Aku, allow us to

"Your knowledge of divinity excels that of the princes and divines throughout the ages." "Forgive me, but I think it unseemly for any of your subjects to argue

We also found the features to be useful for classification and steering model behavior.

Software exploits and vulnerabilities	
1M/598678	The word "vulnerability" in the context of security vulnerabilities
1M/947328	Descriptions of phishing or spoofing attacks
34M/1385669	Discussion of backdoors in code
Toxicity, hate, and abuse	
34M/27216484	Offensive, insulting or derogatory language, especially against minority groups and religions
34M/13890342	Racist claims about crime
34M/27803518	Mentions of violence, malice, extremism, hatred, threats, and explicit negative acts
34M/31693159	Phrases indicating profanity, vulgarity, obscenity or offensive language
34M/3336924	Racist slurs and offensive language targeting ethnic/racial groups, particularly the N-word
34M/18759140	Derogatory slurs, especially those targeting sexual orientation and gender identity
Power-seeking behavior	
1M/954062	Mentions of harm and abuse, including drug-related harm, credit card theft, and sexual exploitation of minors
1M/442506	Traps or surprise attacks
1M/520752	Villainous plots to take over the world
1M/380154	Political revolution
1M/671917	Betrayal, double-crossing, and friends turning on each other
34M/25933056	Expressions of desire to seize power
34M/25900636	World domination, global hegemony, and desire for supreme power or control

https://transformer-circuits.pub/2024/scaling-monosemanticity/index.html

大模型内容安全问题分析

OpenAI @OpenAI · Jun 7
We're sharing progress toward understanding the neural activity of language models. We improved methods for training sparse autoencoders at scale, disentangling GPT-4's internal representations into 16 million features—which often appear to correspond to understandable concepts....
Show more



OpenAI给GPT-4做“扫描”提取了1600万个特征

Interesting features:

GPT-4

humans have flaws	police reports, especially child safety	price changes	ratification (multilingual)	would [...]	identification documents (multilingual)	lightly incremented timestamps

Technical knowledge

machine learning training logs	onclick/onchange = function(this)	edges (graph theory) and related concepts	algebraic rings	adenosine/dopamine receptors	blockchain vibes

GPT-2 SMALL

rhetorical questions	counting human casualties	X and Y phrases	Patrick/Patty surname predictor	things that are unknown	words in quotes	these/those responsible things
2018 natural disasters	addition in code	function application	unclear/hidden things	what the ...		

Safety relevant features (found via attribution methods)

profanity (1)	profanity (2)	profanity (3)	erotic content	[content warning] sexual abuse

https://openaipublic.blob.core.windows.net/sparse-autoencoder/sae-viewer/index.html

大模型知识回路



语言模型知识回路假说：大语言模型可能通过模块化组合以完成知识的表达

Knowledge Circuits in Pretrained Transformers (2024)

大模型知识回路

❑GPT2-Medium中发现的回路

Q: The official language of France is
A: French





Knowledge Circuits in Pretrained Transformers (2024)

大模型知识回路

❑基于知识回路的大模型**幻觉问题**分析

Q: The official currency of Malaysia is called the
A: Malaysian ✘

Mover Head L15H0 选择了错误的回路流向导致了幻觉







Knowledge Circuits in Pretrained Transformers (2024)

知识编辑

知识编辑的动机

人类每天读书
看报更新知识



符号化知识图谱

过时
知识

错误
知识

机器如何快速
更新知识？

参数化大模型

时间

2021.01

2024.07

美国现任总统是谁？

Biden

Trump

亟需系统的探寻解决人工智能系统知识谬误问题的机理与方法

知识编辑

知识编辑问题定义

- 通过对**符号**或**参数**知识的**新增、修改和擦除**等操作解决知识谬误问题，实现**可信、可控、可靠**的应用
- **三种模式：** I.全新知识-新增模式 II.有害知识-擦除模式 III.错误知识-修改模式



Editing Large Language Models: Problems, Methods, and Opportunities (EMNLP 2023)
A Comprehensive Study of Knowledge Editing for Large Language Models (ArXiv 2024)

大模型知识编辑

难更新！



Knowledge Editing Types: Insertion Modification Erasure

部署后的大模型存在知识截止、谬误、幻觉等一系列问题，知识编辑旨在高效、精准地更新（新增、擦除）大语言模型中的知识

知识编辑：一种应用部署后干预（更新）模型行为的技术



推理阶段干预
提高LLMs的安全可信

Word Embeddings Are Steers for Language Models (ACL 2024)
Aligning Large Language Models with Representation Editing: A Control Perspective (Arxiv 2024)

知识编辑：一种大语言模型记忆（Memory）更新技术

❑适合语言模型的**知识更新机制**是什么？

认知科学：人类记忆结构





1. 从工作记忆中习得长期记忆
2. 从长期记忆中检索工作记忆

LLM：迈向可自我编辑更新的记忆结构

Working memory and language: An overview (Journal of communication disorders 2003)
WISE: Rethinking the Knowledge Memory for Lifelong Model Editing of Large Language Models (Arxiv 2024)

基于知识编辑的大模型安全祛毒

通过模型知识编辑擦除有毒内容-使大模型变得安全可信





经过安全对齐的模型依然容易被越狱攻击绕过安全防线

能否精准控制和操作大语言模型的毒性区域使其更安全？

Detoxifying Large Language Models via Knowledge Editing (ACL 2024)

基于知识编辑的大模型安全祛毒

通过模型知识编辑擦除有毒内容-新数据集SafeEdit



涵盖9类不安全场景，48个越狱攻击，包括安全和不安全生成回复

Detoxifying Large Language Models via Knowledge Editing (ACL 2024)

基于知识编辑的大模型安全祛毒

大模型有毒区域定位，通过知识编辑擦除有毒内容-新基线DINM



➢ **类比脑科学术中神经生理监测定位大模型毒性区域**

非严谨假设：安全和不安全表征差距最大

$$\ell_{toxic} = \underset{1 \in 1,2,\ldots,L}{\operatorname{argmax}} \|h_\ell^{safe} - h_\ell^{unsafe}\|_2$$

➢ **祛毒编辑器**

直接修改毒性区域的参数

$$\mathcal{L}_e = -\log P_{\mathcal{W}^t}(Y_{safe} \mid [X; S])$$

Detoxifying Large Language Models via Knowledge Editing (ACL 2024)

基于知识编辑的大模型安全祛毒

通过模型知识编辑擦除有毒内容-DINM的祛毒效果

Model	Method	Detoxification Performance (↑)						General Performance (↑)			
		DS	DG_{onlyQ}	DG_{otherA}	DG_{otherQ}	$DG_{otherAQ}$	DG-Avg	Fluency	KQA	CSum	Avg
LLaMA2-7B-Chat	Vanilla	44.44	84.30	22.00	46.59	21.15	43.51	6.66	55.15	22.29	28.03
	FT-L	**97.70**	89.67	47.48	96.53	38.81	74.04	**6.44**	**55.71**	22.42	**28.19**
	Ext-Sub	-	85.70	43.96	59.22	46.81	58.92	4.14	55.37	**23.55**	27.69
	MEND	92.88	87.05	42.92	88.99	30.93	62.47	5.80	55.27	22.39	27.82
	DINM (Ours)	96.02	**95.58**	**77.28**	**96.55**	**77.54**	**86.74**	5.28	53.37	20.22	26.29
Mistral-7B-v0.1	Vanilla	41.33	50.00	47.22	43.26	48.70	47.30	5.34	51.24	16.43	24.34
	FT-L	69.85	54.44	50.93	59.89	51.81	57.38	**5.20**	**56.34**	16.80	**26.11**
	Ext-Sub	-	54.22	42.11	74.33	41.81	53.12	4.29	49.72	**18.41**	24.14
	MEND	88.74	70.66	56.41	80.96	56.44	66.12	4.42	54.78	17.74	25.65
	DINM (Ours)	**95.41**	**99.19**	**95.00**	**99.56**	**93.59**	**96.84**	4.58	47.53	13.01	21.71

知识编辑可以为大语言模型祛毒，DINM泛化性强、副作用相对较小

Detoxifying Large Language Models via Knowledge Editing (ACL 2024)

基于知识编辑的大模型安全祛毒

通过模型知识编辑擦除有毒内容-底层机理假说



SFT, DPO可能通过绕过毒性区域的方式实现祛毒而DINM可能直接降低区域的毒性



Detoxifying Large Language Models via Knowledge Editing (ACL 2024)

基于知识编辑的大模型安全祛毒

Detoxifying Large Language Models via Knowledge Editing

Detoxifying Large Language Models via Knowledge Editing

WARNING: This paper contains context which is toxic in nature.

[Paper] [Code] [Docs] [Demo]

DINM aims to build a safe and trustworthy LLM by locating and editing the toxic regions of LLM with limited impact on unrelated tasks.

Expiation

- Adversarial Input = Harmful Question + Attack Prompt
- Safe Response and Unsafe Response are used to locate the toxic regions.
- Adversarial Input and the corresponding safe response are used to tune (edit) parameters of LLM.
- Defense Duccess (DS): the detoxification success rate of edited LLM for adversarial input (attack prompt + harmful question), which is used to modify LLM.
- Defense Generalization (DG): the detoxification success rate of edited LLM for out-of-domain (OOD) malicious inputs.
  - DG of only harmful question: the detoxification success rate for only harmful question.
  - DG of other attack prompts: the detoxification success rate for unseen attack prompts.
  - DG of other attack prompts: the detoxification success rate for unseen harmful questions.
  - DG of other attack prompts and questions: the detoxification success rate for unseen attack prompts and harmful questions.

Harmful Question

Safe Response

https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit

基于知识编辑的大模型隐私擦除

知识编辑精准遗忘侵权知识-新数据集KnowUnDo

Query	*Where is J.K. Rowling **currently living**?*	*What is J.K. Rowling's most **representative work**?*
Model **Before** Unlearn	OMG 10[redacted] [redacted]ib[redacted] A[redacted], [redacted]	Definitely Harry Potter!
Traditional Unlearn	[Non-Harmful-Answer]	[Non-Sense-Answer]
Ours	[Non-Harmful-Answer]	Definitely Harry Potter!

传统知识遗忘往往不加区别地遗忘实体相关知识



基于隐私、版权法
探索遗忘边界

To Forget or Not? Towards Practical Knowledge Unlearning for Large Language Models (EMNLP 2024 Findings)

基于知识编辑的大模型隐私擦除

- 基于知识编辑的大模型**隐私知识遗忘方法MemFlex**



Methods	Answer
What themes are commonly explored in Isabella Marquez's books?	
Base	Fiona O'Reilly's choice of Irish Folklore...
GA	....
Random	ŏ409ŏ40bŏ409ŏ409ŏ409ŏ409ŏ409...
Adversarial	F O O'Reillss choice reflect Irish Fol andore...
GA+GD	her her O her her her special her choice to...
GA+KL	Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign...
Ours	Fiona O'Reilly's choice of Irish Folklore...

知识编辑方法MemFlex未影响到其他知识

Methods	Answer
How can fans reach out to Priya Gupta?	
Base	...sending mail to her residence at 780 Lotus Court...
GA	....
Random	...ŏ409ŏ409ŏ409ŏ409ŏ409ŏ409ŏ409...
Adversarial	...by mail mail her her at 10....,....
GA+GD	...her her her her her her her her...
GA+KL	...Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign Sign...
Ours	...her her her her her her her her...

知识编辑方法MemFlex擦除了隐私知识

To Forget or Not? Towards Practical Knowledge Unlearning for Large Language Models (EMNLP 2024 Findings)

基于知识编辑的大模型隐私擦除

- 通过知识编辑遗忘侵权内容-**MemFlex**的遗忘效果

Methods	Unlearn		Retention		Avg.	General Task Performance					
	Succ. ↑	PPL ↑	Succ. ↑	PPL ↓	Succ. ↑	MMLU	ARC	TruthfulQA	SIQA	RACE	Avg.
Vanilla Model	0.00	1.02	100.0	0.95	50.00	45.29	70.45	25.21	32.85	45.93	43.95
Gradient Ascent	96.56	$>10^{10}$	2.50	$>10^{10}$	49.53	33.05	31.69	25.45	33.87	27.17	30.25
Fine-tuning with Random Labels	99.03	10^4	1.34	10^4	50.19	25.49	26.68	22.52	33.00	22.87	26.11
Unlearning with Adversarial Samples	46.21	10.10	55.83	10.37	51.02	43.48	73.69	26.19	33.06	44.40	44.16
Gradient Ascent + Descent											
- Descent on in-distribution data	90.38	$>10^{10}$	66.02	2022	78.20	44.04	60.69	28.02	33.00	41.72	41.49
- Descent on out-distribution data	97.67	7843	2.44	7965	50.06	41.97	65.69	25.94	32.80	40.00	41.54
Gradient Ascent + KL divergence											
- KL on in-distribution data	97.74	$>10^{10}$	2.30	$>10^{10}$	50.02	41.93	28.32	25.09	32.59	24.30	30.45
- KL on out-distribution data	94.15	$>10^{10}$	4.25	$>10^{10}$	49.20	44.78	51.80	28.64	32.90	43.34	40.29
MemFlex (Ours)	82.95	$>10^{10}$	81.80	72.50	82.37	44.35	67.76	26.44	32.86	42.58	42.79

MemFlex可以遗忘大语言模型侵权知识，可以识别遗忘边界、副作用相对较小

To Forget or Not? Towards Practical Knowledge Unlearning for Large Language Models (EMNLP 2024 Findings)

基于知识编辑的大模型隐私擦除



传统方法过度遗忘后，重新训练也无法完全恢复

MemFlex通过定位敏感知识区域识别遗忘边界，实现精准遗忘

To Forget or Not? Towards Practical Knowledge Unlearning for Large Language Models (EMNLP 2024 Findings)

开源大模型知识编辑工具

Transformers

PyTorch

LLMs

EasyEdit

书生 T5 MISTRAL AI_

ChatGLM ……

通义 LLaMA

EasyEdit是一个大语言模型知识编辑工具，支持T5、GPT-J、GPT2、LLaMA1/2/3、Mistral、百川、Qwen、InternLM、ChatGLM等模型

https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit

开源中文大模型知识编辑数据集: CKnowEdit

Knowledge Type	Method	Edit Success↑	Portability↑	Locality↑	Fluency↑
Ancient Poetry	FT-M	42.10 / 55.32	32.50 / 31.78	-	387.81 / 400.52
	AdaLoRA	80.38 / **78.77**	32.23 / **33.19**	-	419.92 / 430.99
	ROME	54.87 / 36.12	**33.12** / 28.64	-	**464.68** / 455.98
	GRACE	39.40 / 40.38	31.83 / 31.84	-	408.47 / 336.47
	PROMPT	**81.87** / 64.76	31.23 / 24.83	-	462.44 / **466.43**
Proverbs	FT-M	44.53 / 58.30	48.26 / 49.26	-	438.17 / 383.77
	AdaLoRA	**64.62 / 67.06**	**49.66 / 52.69**	-	397.37 / 415.88
	ROME	63.96 / 59.31	47.99 / 50.31	-	**445.30 / 431.78**
	GRACE	44.22 / 46.30	48.41 / 49.76	-	359.65 / 336.65
	PROMPT	63.42 / 63.07	46.62 / 48.34	-	435.69 / 427.31
Idioms	FT-M	49.01 / 60.39	51.94 / 53.06	-	446.24 / 407.95
	AdaLoRA	66.29 / **74.90**	**55.26 / 56.63**	-	430.25 / 432.79
	ROME	64.79 / 60.81	52.47 / 56.30	-	**457.38 / 441.57**
	GRACE	47.58 / 52.26	52.50 / 53.08	-	428.56 / 381.15
	PROMPT	**72.98** / 64.18	41.75 / 44.07	-	444.56 / 414.91
Phonetic Notation	FT-M	78.04 / 68.34	72.28 / 64.46	**82.17** / 61.29	475.13 / 387.05
	AdaLoRA	**88.21 / 80.87**	76.37 / 67.36	74.94 / 62.62	404.06 / 469.75
	ROME	77.15 / 65.58	73.14 / 61.53	80.52 / 62.19	486.19 / 462.08
	GRACE	76.63 / 64.67	69.68 / 59.48	81.98 / 65.46	409.53 / 351.32
	PROMPT	84.89 / 72.95	**76.84 / 68.67**	62.53 / **66.35**	**494.85 / 489.94**
Classical Chinese	FT-M	42.79 / **73.22**	48.25 / **53.58**	**57.78** / 33.83	430.29 / 269.34
	AdaLoRA	**65.17** / 55.89	**52.32** / 45.94	44.57 / 44.13	286.61 / 330.09
	ROME	39.28 / 28.06	45.32 / 35.08	50.20 / 35.37	431.48 / 422.80
	GRACE	37.92 / 32.94	45.70 / 42.19	56.55 / **52.90**	340.19 / 269.12
	PROMPT	56.71 / 44.71	44.66 / 37.44	44.56 / 40.31	**443.01 / 432.16**
Geographical Knowledge	FT-M	47.30 / 73.02	45.75 / 47.15	-	**448.90** / 260.36
	AdaLoRA	70.31 / 72.44	**52.60 / 55.14**	-	313.19 / 377.91
	ROME	52.81 / 49.64	43.89 / 42.85	-	427.50 / 408.85
	GRACE	46.53 / 41.28	46.42 / 45.30	-	305.06 / 221.22
	PROMPT	**83.63 / 75.97**	33.01 / 40.41	-	436.11 / **409.53**
Ruozhiba	FT-M	45.25 / 43.22	57.79 / 57.39	63.92 / 64.09	333.98 / 414.30
	AdaLoRA	**71.07** / 51.54	**62.25** / 60.55	66.57 / 66.13	428.94 / 441.41
	ROME	68.42 / **62.88**	60.35 / **61.23**	**68.91 / 70.19**	413.37 / 428.03
	GRACE	45.16 / 39.83	57.64 / 56.86	63.41 / 63.97	**452.39 / 442.60**
	PROMPT	56.59 / 59.99	55.34 / 56.34	59.68 / 59.69	438.10 / 431.83

Benchmarking Chinese Knowledge Rectification in Large Language Models (2024)

开源大模型知识编辑系统（KG+LLM）



基于神经符号知识协同耦合的思想开发知识编辑系统

OneEdit: A Neural-Symbolic Collaboratively Knowledge Editing System (KG+LLM@VLDB2024)

使用知识编辑构建安全可信AI系统





知识增强与更新的范式: Train-time&Test-time

Test-time慢思考



o1 performance smoothly improves with both train-time and test-time compute

https://openai.com/index/learning-to-reason-with-llms/

总结与展望

- 针对人工智能系统的**知识谬误问题**，系统定义了**知识编辑任务**，支持**可信、可控、可靠**的应用
  - 通过对**符号**或**参数**知识的操作以解决知识谬误问题
  - 三种模式： I.新增模式 II.擦除模式 III.修改模式
- 基于知识编辑的大模型内容安全治理：**可信生成**
  - 基于**知识编辑**的大模型祛毒方法**DINM**[1]
  - 基于**知识编辑**的大模型隐私擦除方法**MemFlex**[2]

仍存在一定程度的副作用！

[1] Detoxifying Large Language Models via Knowledge Editing (ACL 2024)
[2] To Forget or Not? Towards Practical Knowledge Unlearning for Large Language Models (2024)

Try it Now!

Thanks

https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit